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Non-technical summary 
Over the last few years, worldwide mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have increased 
sharply both in terms of value and volume. This development has not only been 
driven by corporate acquirers but also to an increasing extent by private equity 
investors. In fact, the share of worldwide private equity sponsored acquisitions in 
terms of total deal value increased from 21.6 percent in 2000 to 33 percent by the end 
of 2006. The increasing activity of private equity investors has been subject to public 
debate, particularly in Europe, about the motivation and objectives of such investors 
as well as on the effects of their engagement on firm performance, long-term 
innovativeness and growth. However, research on private equity acquisitions and how 
they might differ from corporate acquisitions is scarce. In this paper, we analyze 
differences in acquisition motives for corporate and private equity investors. We pay 
particular attention to the importance of technological assets in M&A transactions and 
distinguish between the technological value of patents and their potential to block 
competitors in technology markets. Our empirical results for European firm 
acquisitions in the period from 1999 to 2003 show that both corporate and private 
equity investors pay a higher price for target firms with valuable patents. However, 
patents with a potential to block technology competitors seem to be only of interest to 
corporate investors, especially if these are closely related to the patent portfolio of the 
acquirer. Our results have implications for policy makers and managers, in that M&A 
transactions may considerably decrease competition in technology markets. This 
needs to be reflected in a firm’s M&A strategy. 
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1 Introduction 
Over the last few years, worldwide merger and acquisition (M&A) activity has 
increased sharply. By the end of 2006, the volume of M&A transactions had increased 
from 10,700 transactions in 2000 to more than 37,600 while the total deal value had 
leaped to a new record high at 2.85 trillion Euros in 2006 compared with 2.71 trillion 
Euros in 2000.1 This development, however, was not only due to a growing number of 
corporate acquisitions but also to increased investments by financial investors. In fact, 
the share of worldwide private equity sponsored acquisitions in terms of total deal 
value increased from 21.6 percent in 2000 to 33 percent by the end of 2006. The 
increasing activity of private equity investors has been subject to public debate, 
particularly in Europe, about the motivation and objectives of such investors as well 
as on the effects of their engagement on firm performance, long-term innovativeness 
and growth. However, research on private equity acquisitions and how they might 
differ from corporate acquisitions is scarce.2 This paper is intended to contribute to 
our understanding of the motivation and objectives of both types of investors. We pay 
particular attention to the importance of technologies in firm acquisitions, as they play 
a key role for innovativeness and value creation. 
Gaining access to technological knowledge has, for a number of years, been one of 
the major motives for corporate M&A (e.g., Capron et al., 1998; Graebner, 2004). 
When acquiring technology from external sources, firms aim to develop innovative 
products or services that lead to improved firm value (Griliches, 1981; Pakes, 1985). 
Under the pressure of timing in innovation, M&A transactions give access to 
technology as a firm-specific resource enabling firms to pursue a resource-based 
strategy (e.g., Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Conner, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). This 
strategy aims at accumulating valuable technological assets and redeploying these 
resources between the acquiring and target firm (Capron et al., 1998; Capron and 
Hulland, 1999). The redeployment subsequently allows firms to improve existing 
operations, respond to changes in the competitive environment and to grow as a result 
                                                 
1 Source: ZEPHYR database, Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing. 
2 In the following, we will use the terms “corporate investor” and “private equity investor” to distinguish between 
the two dominant types of acquirers. Frequently, the corresponding terms “strategic investor” and “financial 
investor” can be found in the literature which would – in our understanding – however implicitly assume that 
private equity investors might not have a strategic interest in an acquisition. 
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of new business applications (Teece, 1982; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Sorescu et al., 
2007). 
Resource-based motivations for acquisitions have gained a lot of attention in the 
literature (see Veugelers, 2006, for a survey), but it might be questionable if and to 
what extent they also apply to private equity investors. Private equity investors might 
redeploy managerial skills and financial resources but usually they should not be 
interested in complementing a technology portfolio, as no such portfolio exists in their 
case. Private equity investors rather strive to finance the target firm’s activities for a 
limited period while siphoning off the profits (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). 
Nevertheless, technology should be important as private equity investors frequently 
benefit from disentangling valuable resources and stripping the technological assets. 
A target firm’s endowment with technological assets will therefore play a large part in 
determining the price that is paid by corporate or private equity investors in the 
market for corporate control. However, the question of what particular value both 
types of investors attach to a target’s technological assets, given their different 
objectives and motivations, has remained unexplored so far.  
Among the technological resources, a firm’s patent portfolio in particular can be 
assumed to have a direct influence on innovative capacities (Mansfield, 1986). Patents 
generally serve as a mechanism to appropriate the returns of an innovation but they 
can also be used strategically. Their strategic use involves establishing “patent fences” 
that may block competitors in their innovation activities (Blind et al., 2006; Heeley et 
al., 2007). Technological complementarities between the acquiring and target firm 
should spur post-acquisition innovation (e.g., Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cassiman et al., 
2005) and corporate investors should hence be willing to pay more for those 
technological resources than private equity investors who cannot realize such 
complementarities. Moreover, corporate investors should be able to unlock value if 
they acquire a target firm that has established a patent fence threatening the 
innovation activities of the acquirer. Again, this should lead to differences in the 
valuation of technological resources by corporate and private equity investors. 
Previous studies have largely focused on the importance of technology either in 
corporate acquisitions (e.g., Chakrabarti et al., 1994; Ahuja and Katila, 2001; 
Graebner, 2004) or on the well-covered subtype of private equity that is venture 
capital (e.g., Fenn and Liang, 1998; Wright and Robbie, 1998; Kortum and Lerner, 
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2000; Gompers and Lerner, 2001). Knowledge about private equity sponsored 
transactions, excluding venture capital, and on the role of technology in such 
transactions, however, is scarce. Bearing in mind that M&A transactions might 
involve a bidding situation between corporate and private equity investors, we provide 
theoretical arguments and empirical evidence for differences in the valuation of a 
target’s technological resources. Moreover, we pay particular attention to the value of 
technology as a blocking instrument and contribute to the literature on patent 
indicators (Trajtenberg et al., 1997; Trajtenberg et al., 2000) by proposing a new 
measure to assess the blocking potential of patents. Our results are based on a sample 
of 1,204 European firms that were subject to acquisitions in the period from 1999 to 
2003. With respect to the innovative assets we find that corporate investors are more 
interested in technologies – represented by the patent stock of the target – than are 
private equity investors. Accounting for patent quality – in terms of citations received 
by other patents – our findings show that private equity and corporate investors pay 
roughly the same for valuable patents. Digging deeper into the strategic dimension of 
technology acquisitions, however, our results indicate that corporate investors have a 
significant interest in patents with the potential to block competitors’ innovation 
activities, whereas such patents do not matter to private equity investors. Our results 
have implications for policy makers and managers, in that M&A transactions may 
considerably decrease competition in technology markets. This needs to be reflected 
in a firm’s M&A strategy. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief 
description of the patterns of M&A activity, differentiated by the type of acquirer. 
Section 3 outlines our theoretical considerations and establishes a set of hypotheses. 
Section 4 introduces the data set we use and presents descriptive statistics. The 
empirical test of our hypotheses is provided subsequently. Section 6 discusses our 
results and provides implications for management. The last section concludes with a 
critical evaluation of the study and points out potential areas for further research. 
2 A closer look at corporate and private equity investors 
Drawing a broad distinction between corporate and private equity investors seeking 
acquisition targets in the market for corporate control is somewhat rough, as it does 
not reflect the variety of possible types of investors. These include wealthy 
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individuals, a firm’s own management or bidding consortia that may be composed of 
a corporate investor and one or more private equity investors. Nevertheless, the two 
overall categories provide a useful reference to study differences in the valuation and 
financing of targets. As the literature on company ownership suggests, the type of 
acquirer might have a considerable impact on objectives, corporate strategy and 
performance (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). This is assumed to be reflected in profit 
goals, dividends, capital structure and growth rates (Short, 1994). 
2.1 The characteristics of corporate investors 
Corporate investors typically represent horizontal acquirers operating in the same 
industry as the target company. Industrial organization economics has traditionally 
put emphasis on market power and efficiency gains as drivers of M&A activity 
(Scherer and Ross, 1990). On the one hand, horizontal acquisitions may reduce 
competition and increase market power in product and technology markets 
(Chakrabarti et al., 1994; Mukherjee et al., 2004). On the other hand, they engage in 
firm acquisitions to realize economies of scale in production as well as in research and 
development (R&D) (Cassiman et al., 2005). Following a firm acquisition, fixed costs 
can be spread over the larger post-acquisition output of the merged entities and costs 
can be further decreased as duplicated inputs for the same output are eliminated in 
R&D and production processes. A second important factor in firm acquisitions is that 
of economies of scope. Post-acquisition investments can be jointly optimized using 
the fact that costs can be spread over different projects in production, marketing, 
R&D etc.  
Complementarily to the industrial organization perspective, strategy researchers have 
argued that M&A transactions can be used to reconfigure the acquirer’s or target’s 
business, in order to respond to changes in the competitive environment or enhance 
and improve existing operations (e.g., Bowman and Singh, 1993; Capron et al., 1998; 
Capron and Hulland, 1999). Reconfiguring the business goes along with a 
redeployment of resources which, in case of R&D, may involve personnel, 
laboratories and technical instruments being physically transferred to new locations or 
used in different R&D projects, for example. Moreover, the combination of two 
product or technology portfolios provides an opportunity to exploit complementarities 
(Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Colombo et al., 2006) that result from a skilled unbundling 
and bundling of resources with the objective to enhance (technological) core 
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competencies of the merged entity (Cassiman et al., 2005; Sorescu et al., 2007). 
Finally, intellectual property rights protecting technological knowledge through 
patents often play an important role in M&A transactions because corporate investors 
may need the rights to intellectual property held by the target firm in order to continue 
or expand ongoing research (O'Donoghue et al., 1998; Lerner et al., 2003). Besides 
this rather defensive action, acquirers might also choose to offensively block 
competitors in their R&D activities. 
2.2 The characteristics of private equity investors 
In contrast to corporate investors, private equity investors are mainly motivated by the 
chance to obtain financial success in a relatively short time frame (Thomsen and 
Pedersen, 2000; Kaplan and Schoar, 2005). They supply private equity to the target 
firm in order to initiate often broad and widespread reorganization processes as well 
as to impose tight financial and operational controls with the objective of increasing 
the target’s competitiveness and value. This typically involves the redeployment of 
managerial skills and financial resources. Depending on whether the target firm is 
more or less mature, private equity may take on the form of venture capital, which is 
usually less risk-averse than publicly available equity (Gompers and Lerner, 2001; 
Wright and Robbie, 1998). Venture capital, a subtype of private equity, is mainly 
concentrated on bringing new and prospective technologies to the market. It has been 
shown to spur innovation considerably (Fenn and Liang, 1998; Kortum and Lerner, 
2000, for the US; Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002, for Europe). Later stage private equity 
includes buyouts of undervalued or distressed companies to reap the profits from 
disentangling resources and stripping the assets (Kucher and Meitner, 2004). 
Moreover, private equity can imply significant benefits for the target, e.g. by 
mobilizing research and commercial partners (Folta and Janney, 2004) or by 
providing management advice (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003). In any case, the 
acquirer’s engagement in the target is limited in time and geared towards a successful 
exit, e.g. in the form of an initial public offering (IPO) in the stock market, a trade 
sale to a corporate investor or a secondary purchase by another private equity firm 
(Brav and Gompers, 1997).  
According to the European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (EVCA, 
2006), private equity transactions in Europe, including the subtype venture capital, 
leaped to a record level of 71.8 billion Euro in 2005, more than two and a half times 
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the amount of 27.5 billion Euro raised the year before. Among the institutions 
investing in private equity funds, pension funds were the largest contributor, followed 
by banks. Pension funds in particular increased their investment allocation to private 
equity funds in the belief that the returns are largely uncorrelated with public markets 
(Gompers and Lerner, 2001). The assumption here is that firms receiving private 
equity remain privately held for a number of years. However, there appears to be a 
clear linkage between the public and private equity market that becomes apparent 
when the investor prepares its exit, e.g. through an IPO (Brav and Gompers, 1997).  
Regarding the structure of private equity investments, buyouts represented 68.2 
percent of the total value but only 22 percent of the total number of investments. Seed 
investments accounted for only 0.2 percent by value and 4 percent by number, while 
start-up investments represented 5 percent by value and 29 percent by number. A 
share of 42 percent by number and 21.8 percent by value is due to expansion 
investments. The remainder is accounted for by replacement capital (EVCA, 2006). 
The majority of private equity deals are thus venture capital investments (seed, start-
up and expansion) which, however, only correspond to 27 percent of the total value 
invested. In the following, we will focus on private equity buyouts and exclude 
venture capital from our discussion. First, venture capital can be regarded as a very 
special form of private equity that is brought in when technologies have not been 
commercialized yet and the firm might not have even been founded (Wright and 
Robbie, 1998). In contrast to this, private equity buyouts address rather mature firms 
with an established technology commercialization process. This makes them 
comparable to corporate acquisitions. Second, venture capital engagements would in 
most cases not qualify as M&A transactions, which is why they would not appear in 
M&A databases either.  
Private equity buyouts are typically structured as leveraged buyouts with a high share 
of debt. In contrast, corporate investors tend to finance their transactions with a larger 
share of equity, for example by an exchange of stock. The private equity firm collects 
funds to set up a new firm as an acquisition vehicle that is equipped with the desired 
amount of debt and equity. This firm is subsequently used to acquire the selected 
target and finally merged with it to create a new company with a capital structure 
different from the initial structure of the target. A major advantage of debt financing 
is that it can be raised at significantly lower costs than equity, especially when interest 
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rates are low, as they have been worldwide for more than a decade now. By 
employing a share of 70 to 80 percent of debt to finance an acquisition, private equity 
investors have the chance to leverage their internal rate of return considerably 
(Arundale, 2002). To apply such a financing structure to a potential target firm, 
however, requires the target to have a suitable capital structure. This means that the 
debt to equity ratio must not exceed a certain threshold, above which additional debt 
would overburden the firm after the acquisition. In this case the firm would not be 
able to afford the interest and repayments on the debt in the long run. In the next 
section of the paper, we turn to our conceptual model outlining our hypotheses on 
differences in the valuation of a target’s technology, depending on the type of 
acquirer. 
3 The pricing of technological assets in M&A transactions 
Financial market efficiency suggests that the market value of a firm reflects the 
available information that relates to its current and future profitability (Fama, 1970). 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) have argued that acquisitions typically involve a 
significant positive control premium over the market value of the target firm. We 
hypothesize that the type of acquirer affects the price and hence also the premium 
paid for a target’s technological assets. This should be dependent on two factors: the 
technological content and the blocking potential of a target’s technological resources. 
3.1 Technological content and the value of technology 
We have argued that technological assets in acquisitions serve different objectives for 
the two types of investors. Corporate investors presumably screen technology markets 
carefully as they are interested in acquisition targets that will complement their 
technology portfolio the most effectively (Frey and Hussinger, 2006). Corporate 
investors are hence interested in technologies and intellectual property with a 
particular technological content. Resource-based theory suggests that 
complementarity effects between acquirer and target result from bundling strategic 
resources into unique and valuable combinations (Barney, 1991; Conner, 1991; 
Peteraf, 1993). Through this process of resource redeployment (Capron et al., 1998; 
Capron and Hulland, 1999), a merged entity may create a new or improved set of 
capabilities providing the basis for superior firm performance and competitive 
advantage (Penrose, 1959; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Priem and Butler, 2001; 
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Sorescu et al., 2007). In contrast, private equity investors are typically not interested 
in specific technologies, as long as the technologies employed in a potential target 
company serve as a basis for revenue generation. Their opportunities for resource 
redeployment are limited and confined to managerial skills or financial resources. 
Regarding technology, they will not be able to realize value through 
complementarities.3 Following this argumentation, corporate investors should be 
willing to pay a higher price for technology compared with private equity investors. 
However, valuable resources of a target firm, which could provide complementarities 
or generate revenues first need to be identified by the investor. The ability of an 
investor to judge the potential of externally available technologies and hence to value 
the innovation activities of a prospective target firm has been discussed from different 
theoretical perspectives. One of these perspectives has been summarized in the 
literature as the absorptive capacity of a firm (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, 1990). 
Absorptive capacity is generally developed as a by-product of a firm’s own R&D 
activities. It is made up of three major components: the identification of valuable 
technological knowledge in the environment, its assimilation with existing knowledge 
stocks and the final exploitation for successful innovation. Absorptive capacities 
hence increase awareness for market and technology trends, which can be translated 
into pre-emptive actions (Bowman and Hurry, 1993). As a result, they enable firms to 
predict future developments more accurately (Cohen and Levinthal, 1994).  
Corporate investors who wish to realize complementarities have conducted R&D 
activities of their own, suggesting that they have also developed absorptive capacities 
in a particular technology field. However, it might not be appropriate to assume that 
private equity investors do not have such capacities at their disposal. There are 
basically two channels by which private equity investors may develop absorptive 
capacities equivalent to those developed through R&D activities. First, private equity 
investors have typically acquired a large number of firms over time. The dominant 
players on the market like Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (KKR), Blackstone or the Carlyle 
Group usually acquire 20 to 50 firms a year. The importance of experience in M&A 
transactions for post-acquisition performance has been highlighted in several studies 
                                                 
3 An exception might be private equity investors that follow a buy-and-build strategy, i.e. who acquire several 
related firms which are merged together to form a new entity. 
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(e.g., Gerpott, 1995; Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002). Given 
prior acquisition experience, private equity investors will therefore have a fairly exact 
idea of what to focus on during the target selection process. Second, private equity 
investors frequently employ technology experts or cultivate their own specific 
knowledge, e.g. by hiring staff with special knowledge of an industry or technology. 
Hence, absorptive capacities alone do not provide a sufficient reason for assuming 
valuation differences between corporate and private equity investors. 
Another theoretical perspective for analyzing the ability of an investor to judge the 
potential of externally available technologies has emerged from the literature on 
information asymmetries in investment decisions (e.g., Aboody and Lev, 2000; Cohen 
and Dean, 2005; Heeley et al., 2007). Generally speaking, investors face the challenge 
of determining the value of a potential target’s innovation activities in the absence of 
detailed information on every single innovation project. Each innovation project has 
its own specific attributes which are generally kept secret by a firm to ensure the 
appropriability of the returns from innovation activities. As the corporate and the 
private equity investor are equally affected by the level of confidentiality, they may 
use publicly available information sources like patent data to assess the quality of a 
firm’s innovation activities (Heeley et al., 2007). In order for a patent to be granted 
and offered protection, the technological content of the patent needs to be disclosed 
by the applicant to the patent office. However, Heeley et al. (2007) have argued that 
the information disclosed in the patent provides only little, if any, clue as to the ability 
of the patent holder to extract value from commercialization activities. As it is highly 
technical information, providing only those “skilled in the art” with relevant 
knowledge about the true content, there is a substantial information asymmetry 
between informed and uninformed investors. This difference becomes even more 
pronounced when technological complexity increases, as is typically the case in high-
technology industries. 
Given the previous discussion on absorptive capacity, corporate investors should be in 
a favorable position to value technology based on patent data. They are used to 
dealing with patents in their own R&D activities and they need to consider other 
patents when they decide to file a patent application. Nevertheless, private equity 
investors skilled in the art may be able to compensate for this advantage of corporate 
investors, as discussed above. Hence, we extend the theoretical argument of 
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information asymmetries to the typical investment lifecycle of private equity: While 
these investors may be adequately skilled to value the technology of a target firm at 
the time of the acquisition they will be uncertain about the resale value of the target 
firm at the time of the desired exit, for example through a trade sale to a corporate 
investor. This uncertainty directly results from risks associated with the technology, 
which might have become obsolete or have been substituted or shown to be 
unfeasible. Moreover, the private equity investor will be uncertain about existing 
resale opportunities, i.e. whether it will be possible to find a corporate investor within 
a limited timeline who can reasonably use the technology and benefit from 
complementarities. In contrast to this, corporate investors will be almost immediately 
aware of potential complementarities at the time of the acquisition. From this it 
follows that private equity investors will presumably discount the value of acquired 
technology compared to corporate investors (Hertzel and Smith, 1993). This investor 
discount can also be found in the acquisition of unlisted target firms (Officer, 2007). 
Another example is the IPO market, where information asymmetries may lead to a 
considerable underpricing of a firm’s assets (Heeley et al., 2007).  
Taking both theoretical arguments together, i.e. the complementarity of technological 
resources providing benefits for corporate investors and the discounting of acquired 
technology by private equity investors, leads to the conclusion that corporate investors 
will presumably pay a higher price for the technology of target firms than private 
equity investors. The value of technology can then be split up into the number of 
technologies to be acquired and the quality of each technology. Roughly equating a 
technology with a patent, a patent acts, first of all, as a positive signal as it shows that 
the firm in question has already proven its technological expertise and capabilities and 
that it has a well-functioning laboratory and inventor team (Ndofor and Levitas, 2004; 
Levitas and McFadyen, 2006; Heeley et al., 2007). Moreover, patents can be sold 
individually after the acquisition. As patents have a signaling and a potential resale 
value for both types of investors but, on top of that, an additional value for corporate 
investors from a combination with existing knowledge stocks, while considering the 
private equity discount, we hypothesize that corporate investors will pay a higher 
price for a stock of patents than private equity investors. 
Hypothesis 1a: The price paid for an acquisition target increases with the target’s 
patent stock. 
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Hypothesis 1b: Corporate investors pay more on average for a target‘s patent stock 
than private equity investors. 
Recalling that both types of investors will have developed absorptive capacities that 
stem either from their own R&D activities or prior acquisition experience and 
acquired technological knowledge, we argue that both will also be able to identify 
valuable technological resources, i.e. high-quality patents. But again, there will 
presumably be an on-top effect from complementarities for corporate investors as 
well as a discount for private equity investors with respect to patent quality. Our 
second hypothesis hence reads: 
Hypothesis 2a: The price paid for an acquisition target with more valuable patents is 
higher than for a target with less valuable patents. 
Hypothesis 2b: Corporate investors pay more on average for valuable patents than 
private equity investors. 
In the next section, we turn to the second factor in the valuation of technology which 
is the blocking potential of acquired technology. 
3.2 Competitor blocking as strategic value of patents 
Besides the acquisition of valuable technological assets that might complement the 
existing technology portfolio or that serve as a basis for revenue creation, another 
objective for M&A transactions has been identified: to enhance the position of the 
merged entity in technology competition (Cassiman et al., 2005). By pooling 
technological assets the merged entity is in a position to create significant barriers to 
entry into particular technology lines. In other words, patents can be used to block 
competitors from developing a competing alternative technology (Heeley et al., 
2007). This section therefore shifts the emphasis to a third function of patents. 
Besides the knowledge protection character of patents and their signaling effect for 
potential investors, patents can block successive patent applications by threatening 
their novelty requirements (Scotchmer, 1991; Shapiro, 2001; Jaffe and Lerner, 2004). 
In fact, survey evidence for the US and Europe has shown that the protection of 
intellectual property, i.e. what patents were originally conceived for, in order to 
stimulate incentives to innovate by granting the inventor a temporary monopoly on 
her invention, is not what makes them attractive in the first place (Arundel et al., 
1995; Cohen et al., 2000). The value of patents is often determined instead by their 
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importance in licensing and M&A negotiations and by their capability to block the 
inventions of competitors. A recent survey for Germany shows that more than 40 
percent of patenting firms apply for patents in order to block competitors (Blind et al., 
2007). Blind et al. (2007) find particularly striking evidence of “defensive blocking” 
through patenting.  They define this as a forward-looking protection strategy directed 
at protecting the firm’s position in technology markets.  
Obviously, both types of investors will have a substantial interest in acquiring those 
technologies that have blocking potential. Moreover, as before we assume that both 
will be equally capable of identifying such patents. The importance of such patents, 
however, will again differ between corporate and private equity investors. On the one 
hand, corporate investors might find themselves in a situation where their own R&D 
activities are hindered as they are confronted with existing patent fences. The strategic 
importance of being able to continue with these R&D activities will presumably be 
higher when considerable (sunk) investments have already been made in a particular 
technology line, when major products or services offered by the firm depend on 
further development of a particular technology or when firms want to diversify into a 
promising product market. On the other hand, corporate investors might want to build 
up their own blocking potential against undesired competition. In contrast to this, 
private equity investors again face the challenge of uncertainty about the future 
prospects of a technology with blocking potential. Competitors may be able to “invent 
around” that technology, quickly making it obsolete. This hence leads to a discount in 
the valuation process. Although we argue that both types of investors should be 
willing to pay more for technologies with a blocking potential, we hypothesize that 
the effect for corporate investors will be higher compared with private equity 
investors who might discount the patent value. Our third hypothesis hence reads: 
Hypothesis 3a: The price paid for an acquisition target with blocking patents is 
higher than for a target without these patents. 
Hypothesis 3b: Corporate investors pay more on average for blocking patents than 
private equity investors. 
Moreover, we hypothesize that corporate investors will have a particular interest in 
those target patents that have a blocking potential and that are closely related to the 
technology employed by the acquirer. This interaction represents the situation that 
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corporate investors want to “un-block” their own R&D activities, which presumably 
directly translates into a higher willingness to pay for such patents. This leads to our 
final hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: The price paid by corporate investors for an acquisition target with 
blocking patents that are closely related to the acquirer’s technology is higher than 
for a target without these patents.  
In conclusion, we argue that technological assets of a potential target firm are a major 
driver for the price paid in the market for corporate control. However, the two basic 
types of investors – corporate and private equity investors – are supposed to attach 
systematically varying values to the target’s assets. The valuation stems from different 
opportunities to redeploy resources after the acquisition as well as from discounts 
made by private equity investors due to uncertainty about the expected resale value. In 
the next section we present our empirical model to test our theoretical considerations. 
4 Methods 
4.1 Empirical Model 
In our empirical model we explain the deal value of the acquisition, i.e. the price paid 
by the acquirer, by the target firm’s assets and characteristics. Our aim in doing so is 
to derive insights into the importance of technologies for different types of acquirers. 
We define the acquired company in a hedonic way as a bundle of its characteristics 
and assets X (Gompers and Lerner, 2000). The deal value of the target V is a function 
of those characteristics X. In the presence of efficient markets and full information 
V(X) would equal the price at which the target firm’s assets are traded. Our empirical 
model then shows how the deal value is decomposed with respect to the target firm’s 
characteristics and assets. As outlined above, our main focus is on the contribution of 
different variables that capture the target’s innovative assets. We use a flexible 
specification that allows deals with private equity investor involvement (PEI) to differ 
from corporate investor (CI) acquisitions in their intercept as well as in their slope 
coefficients: 
uXcfPEIXfCIcXV PEI +++= ),(*)(*)( . (1) 
u is the error term of the empirical model which can be estimated using ordinary least 
squares (OLS). c refers to the intercept of the model and cPEI depicts the deviation 
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from the joint intercept c for private equity investors. The target’s bundle of 
characteristics is defined as its total assets, return on assets, total liabilities and firm 
age. To test our hypotheses on the value of technologies for different acquirers we 
introduce different measures for the target’s technological assets: the patent stock, the 
forward citations that its patents received in a five-year window and a measure of the 
patents’ capability to block other patents. Moreover, for corporate investors we 
include a measure of technological relatedness that is subsequently interacted with the 
measure for blocking patents. Their definitions will be detailed in the following 
section. Finally, measures for prior acquisition experience as well as industry and year 
dummies are included to control for the different economic conditions and stock 
market levels during the period from 1999 to 2003. All continuous variables reflect 
the target’s assets and characteristics in the year prior to the completion of the 
acquisition; they are all measured in logarithms to take account of the skewness of 
their distributions.  
4.2 Data sources and measures 
Our main source of data is the merger and acquisition database ZEPHYR from 
Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing. We identified firms located in Europe that 
were subject to an acquisition by a corporate or private equity investor in the five-year 
period from 1999 to 2003. To distinguish between corporate and private equity 
investors we relied on the acquirer industry classification provided in the ZEPHYR 
database. Moreover, only targets from the manufacturing sector were included as 
patents are of minor importance for services. Our sample consists of 1,204 target 
firms with known deal values. Financial information on the firms is taken from 
Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing’s Amadeus database. As our main focus is on 
innovative assets, we linked the acquisition targets to their patent history as patent 
applicants at the European Patent Office (EPO).4 Based on a computer supported text 
based search algorithm, target firms and patent applications were linked to each other 
using firm names and addresses in both databases. Each potential match proposed by 
the search engine was checked manually. 
                                                 
4 Dating patents according to their application date as opposed to the granting date conforms with common 
practice (e.g. Griliches, 1981). The application date has the advantage of being closer to the actual completion of 
the invention. 
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Focusing on the target’s technological assets, we use three variables to capture 
different aspects of the target companies’ innovative activities. In line with several 
recent papers all measures are based on the EPO patent data. First, we use the patent 
stock (PS) to proxy the number of technologies the firm owns, which is calculated as 
follows: 
ttt nsapplicatiopatentPSPS _)1(1 +−= − δ  (2) 
where δ represents the constant knowledge depreciation rate, which is set to 15 
percent as is standard in the literature (e.g. Hall, 1990). This variable is used to test 
the importance of the quantity of patents held by the target company for the acquirer 
(Hypotheses 1a, 1b). The second variable is the citation rate, which describes the 
average patent value proxied by the sum of citations the patents received in a five-
year window after the patent publication date (Hypotheses 2a, 2b). Patent citations 
have frequently been shown to be a reliable measure of patent quality and hence value 
(Harhoff et al., 2003; Harhoff et al., 2005). Patents receive citations when subsequent 
patents make reference to relevant prior art during the patent application process. The 
more frequently a patent is cited by other patents, the higher is its presumable 
importance in a particular technology field. The citations are hence called “forward 
citations”. As the citations a firm receives are highly correlated with its patent stock, 
we divide the number of citations by the number of patents for our empirical 
specification. The estimated coefficient can be interpreted as the premium an 
acquiring firm pays for the value of the target’s patents on top of the price paid for the 
patented technologies themselves. 
The third technology measure we use is a proxy for the potential of patents to block 
other patents (Hypothesis 3a, 3b). The blocking potential measure we propose is also 
based on forward citations, making particular use of the citation system at the EPO. 
For each EPO patent the patent examiner prepares a so-called “search report” that lists 
all important documents which are considered as prior art. Based on the search report 
a decision is made as to whether a patent application is novel enough to be granted. 
An interesting feature of the EPO search reports as opposed to search reports at the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is that references to prior art are 
classified according to their importance for the patent filing. Prior art which threatens 
the novelty requirement of the patent application is thus made visible. In the search 
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report, references made for individual claims in the patent application are marked 
with an “X” if the invention cannot be considered to be novel or cannot be considered 
to involve an inventive step when the referenced document alone is taken into 
consideration. References are marked with a “Y” if the invention cannot be 
considered to involve an inventive step when the referenced document is combined 
with one or more other documents of the same category, such a combination being 
obvious to a person skilled in the art (Harhoff et al., 2005). A patent can still be 
granted (although this is less likely) if it has many references classified with X or Y. 
This can be the case for patent applications with many claims. X and Y references 
may only pertain to single claims and the remaining claims can be strong enough to 
get a (modified) application granted. All forward citation measures are constructed 
based on the EPO/OECD patent citation database. Patent equivalents, i.e. if a 
particular invention is patented at two different patent offices, are taken into account. 
If patent equivalents were ignored, the number of forward citations a patent receives 
would be significantly underestimated (Harhoff et al., 2005). Figure 1 gives an 
overview of the patent application procedure at the EPO. 



















references to prior art:
- Patent A : X













We assume that patent A and patent B are held by a potential target firm. Both patents 
are cited by an incoming patent application C as prior art. In the search report, the 
patent examiner evaluates the importance of the references made for a particular claim 
by assigning a code letter “X” and “Y”, respectively (for a full description of all EPO 
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code letters see Harhoff et al., 2005). We use the sum of X and Y citations that patent 
A and patent B receive in a five-year window to proxy their value as blocking patents. 
To account for the high correlation between citations received and the subset of X or 
Y citations received we normalize this measure by the total number of forward 
citations. Hence we use the percentage of X and Y citations in order to represent the 
threatening power of the patents. Again, the estimated coefficient depicts the premium 
that acquiring firms pay for the blocking potential of the target company’s patents on 
top of what they pay for the patented technologies and their value as measured by 
citations. 
To control for technological proximity of the patent portfolios of acquiring and target 
firm we use the proximity measure introduced to the patent literature by Jaffe (1986). 
As the technological content of the assets to be acquired is assumed only to be 
important for corporate investors the proximity measure is only calculated for these 
investors. After all, it would be impossible to calculate the measure for private equity 
investors as they do not possess a patent portfolio. In order to calculate this measure 
we determined patent stocks for each firm, categorized into 2-digit technology classes 
according to the International Patent Classification (IPC). This yields a technology 
vector F for each target i and acquirer j, which can be interpreted as their technology 
portfolio. Using these vectors (as a percentage of the total patent stock) technological 








T . (3) 
Prior literature suggests an inverted U-shaped relationship between the relatedness of 
the acquirer’s and target’s technology portfolio and innovation performance (Ahuja 
and Katila, 2001). On the one hand, new acquired knowledge may provide additional 
stimuli and information to the acquirer’s knowledge base. On the other hand, acquired 
knowledge that is too closely related to the existing knowledge is presumably of 
limited benefit. This pattern should be reflected in the price that acquiring firms pay 
for their purchase, as the deal price is supposed to capture the expected value of the 
innovative assets for the acquiring firm. To allow for such a non-linear relationship 
between deal value and technological proximity, we also use a squared term of the 
proximity measure in our empirical model. 
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Moreover, to test hypothesis 4 we define a binary variable that equals 1 if 
technological proximity between the M&A partners is larger than zero and the target 
firm owns patents with a blocking potential. For all other constellations the dummy 
equals zero. Sticking to a binary variable is necessary in order to avoid 
multicollinearity in the presence of multiple technology measures. The estimated 
coefficient of the dummy shows whether blocking patents are more important for 
acquiring firms which are active in technology areas related to the acquisition target.  
Regarding the non-technological assets, we include the following: the total assets; the 
return on assets, defined as the sum of profits earned by the firm and the capital gains 
of assets over the market value of assets in the year prior to the acquisition; the 
leverage, defined as the total liabilities of the target over total assets; and the age of 
the target, measured in years. Finally, besides industry and year dummies, our 
regressions control for prior acquisition experience of corporate and private equity 
investors. We include a dummy variable that is set to 1 if a corporate or private equity 
investor acquired at least one firm before the focal transaction. Moreover, we include 
a dummy variable for private equity investors that is set to 1 if that investor acquired 
more than five firms prior to the focal transaction, in order to control for very frequent 
acquirers. It turns out that no corporate investor in our sample has such an acquisition 
record. Table 4 in the Appendix shows the frequency distribution of acquisitions per 
acquiring firm in our sample. 
5 Results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the sample of target firms. All 
continuous variables except for the deal value refer to the year prior to completion of 
the acquisition. First of all, the descriptive statistics show that, on average, corporate 
investors pay a much higher price for their targets than private equity investors. This 
is related to the average size of the targets - targets of private equity investors are 
significantly smaller than firms subject to corporate acquisitions, in terms of pre-
acquisition total assets. Furthermore, targets of private equity investors are, on 
average, less profitable, as indicated by the returns on assets. For both types of 
acquisition targets the average return on assets is negative. The value for leverage is 
similar for the targets of the two types of investor, which indicates a rather equal risk 
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associated with these targets. Table 1 further indicates that private equity investors 
prefer younger firms. Targets of private equity investors are on average 11 years 
younger than those bought by corporate acquirers. The descriptive statistics thus 
already hint that corporate and private equity investors are interested in considerably 
different firm profiles. The findings suggest that private equity investors – in contrast 
to corporate investors – tend to prefer rather distressed firms or younger firms with 
potentially unstable revenue and earning flows. 
Regarding the technological assets of the target, Table 1 shows that acquisition targets 
of private equity investors are roughly three times as innovative as the targets of 
corporate investors in terms of their patent stock over total assets. This changes when 
the average patent value is considered, as proxied by the sum of citations the patents 
received. However, 79 percent of the patents owned by the targets of corporate and 
private equity investors receive no citations at all, which indicates a highly skewed 
distribution of patent value (Harhoff et al., 2003; Harhoff et al., 2005). Interestingly, 
the descriptive statistics show that the patents of targets involved in deals with a 
private equity investor have, on average, more blocking citations (i.e., X and Y 
citations) than the patents acquired from targets of corporate investors. The lower part 
of Table 1 shows the results for patenting firms only. Generally speaking, the results 
for the total sample can be reproduced. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 Private equity targets # 725 
Corporate targets 
# 479  





deal value (mio EUR) 36.713 115.635 78.922*** 
 (154.087) (337.385) (14.371) 
total assets (mio EUR) 68.424 110.786 42.362*** 
 (176.871) (299.685) (13.753) 
return on assets (%) -12.416 -0.591 11.825*** 
 (25.417) (19.661) (1.372) 
leverage 0.572 0.587 0.015 
 (0.337) (0.265) (0.018) 
age (years) 11.654 22.921 11.267*** 
 (25.417) (24.039) (1.266) 
patent stock/assets 0.503 0.179 -0.0003*** 
 (2.021) (1.294) (0.0001) 
citation rate 0.355 0.430 0.043 
 (0.763) (1.180) (0.060) 
blocking potential 0.144 0.078 -0.066*** 
 (0.286) (0.193) (0.015) 
technological proximity  0.007  
  (0.041)  
interaction proximity/  0.054  
blocking patents  (0.227)  
acquisition experience 0.552 0.203 -0.349*** 
 (0.498) (0.402) (0.027) 
acquisition experience (≥ 5) 0.316   
 (0.465)   
    
Patenting firms only: # 189 # 90  
patent stock/assets 1.931 0.950 -0.0009** 
 (3.600) (2.874) (0.0004) 
technological proximity  0.021  
  (0.070)  
citation rate 0.705 0.849 0.110 
 (0.859) (0.761) (0.115) 
blocking potential 0.375 0.280 -0.095** 
 (0.346) (0.273) (0.042) 
interaction proximity/  0.222  
blocking patents  (0.418)  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
 
To further explore the relationships between the variables, Table 3 in the appendix 
reports the bivariate correlations. The coefficients above the diagonal refer to the 
corporate investors while the coefficients below the diagonal depict the private equity 
investors. It turns out that for both corporate and private equity investors total assets 
are positively correlated with the deal value. Regarding the return on assets, however, 
there is a positive relationship with the deal value only for the private equity 
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investors. This suggests that private equity investors are much more interested in the 
financial profitability of the target than corporate investors, who might have different 
priorities. In fact, corporate investors seem to put a much higher emphasis on the 
technological assets of the target. The patent stock, the patent value and the blocking 
potential of the patents are positively correlated with the deal value, whereas only the 
patent value seems to be of importance for private equity investors. Their interest in 
blocking patents turns out to be much weaker. Finally, the age of the target firm is 
positively correlated with the deal value for both types of investors. However, this 
relationship proves to be stronger for private equity investors. 
5.2 Multivariate analysis 
Table 2 shows the results from the OLS estimation in three different model 
specifications. The intercept for private equity firms indicates that, on average, private 
equity investors pay significantly more than corporate investors. Given that the deal 
value consists of the market value of the respective target plus a merger premium, this 
indicates that after controlling for assets, technologies etc. private equity investors 
generally pay more than corporate investors. This can be attributed to a number of 
reasons which will be outlined in more detail in the following section. Focusing on 
the value of technologies, the first specification, which includes the volume and value 
of technological assets, suggests that patents are valuable for both types of investors 
(Hypothesis 1a) and that corporate investors value patents much more highly than 
private equity investors (Hypothesis 1b).5 Our first hypothesis can hence be 
confirmed. Part of this can be attributed to the different meaning patents have in 
acquisitions. On the one hand, patents have a technological value that can be 
exploited in the merged company or through selling the patents after the acquisition. 
On the other hand, patents work as a signal for the technological fitness of a potential 
target company. The signaling function and the resale value of patents are supposed to 
be the more important features of patents for private equity acquirers as their 
acquisitions are supposed to be less content-driven. In contrast to this, corporate 
investors have more opportunities to redeploy resources and realize the benefits from 
technology complementarities, which is why they also attach a higher value to the 
                                                 
5 A t-test for equality of the coefficients for the patent stocks of private equity and corporate investors shows that 
the null hypothesis of equality can be rejected at a 10% level of statistical significance. 
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technology stock of the target. Citations as a measure for the value of the 
technological assets show that a significant part of the attractiveness of patents is 
explained by their value rather than by their volume (Hypothesis 2a). Hypothesis 2b, 
however, is rejected, as the coefficient for private equity investors turns out not to be 
different from the coefficient for corporate investors at any convenient level of 
statistical significance as a t-test suggests.  
Model 2, which takes the value of blocking patents into account, shows that corporate 
investors are highly interested in securing or enhancing their position in technology 
markets through firm acquisitions, whereas there is no such evidence for private 
equity investors. Therefore, hypothesis 3a is rejected while hypothesis 3b receives 
support. This model specification shows that a significant part of the difference 
between private equity and corporate investors in technologies relates to their 
different valuation of blocking patents. Our third model shows a positive and 
significant interaction term, which means that corporate investors are highly 
interested in those patents that have a blocking potential and that are closely related to 
their own technology base. Hypothesis 4 hence receives support. Including this 
measure in the regression does not alter the coefficients discussed above. In fact, 
results turn out to be robust across the three model specifications. To sum up, the 
most notable difference in the investors’ attitude towards patents lies in their ability to 
secure a firm’s future position in technology markets through the blocking potential of 
its patents.  
Apart from the variables used to test the hypotheses the results show that the 
relatedness of the target firm’s technology portfolio is of high importance for the 
corporate investors. As expected, the coefficients hint at an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between the relatedness of the technology portfolios and the deal value. 
Corporate investors are hence willing to pay for technological assets that provide 
opportunities for cross-fertilization. However, the deal value is negatively affected 
when the technology portfolios are too closely related. Similar results for the 
relationship between technology relatedness and innovation performance (Ahuja and 
Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006) can therefore be extended to the market for 
corporate control. In fact, the price paid for a target should reflect the future 
innovation potential of the merged entity. 
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Furthermore, Table 2 shows some interesting results regarding the remaining 
variables that refer to the target’s characteristics and assets. Focusing on total assets, 
the coefficients for both types of investors are positive and significant. The magnitude 
indicates that corporate investors attach a higher value to the target’s assets.6 
Referring to the return on assets, there is only a rather small positive effect on the deal 
value for corporate investors.7 The leverage of the target firm turns out not to be 
important for the deal value. In contrast to this, the age of the target plays a significant 
role for private equity investors but is of no importance for corporate investors. The 
results hence tend to suggest that younger target firms exhibit a higher uncertainty 
about their actual value (Shen and Reuer, 2005). Furthermore, the measures for prior 
acquisition experience turn out to be insignificant, except for the frequent acquisition 
experience which is positively associated with the price that private equity investors 
pay. Finally, industry and year are jointly significantly different from zero as LR-Chi2 
-tests show (Table 2). 




(st. err. A) 
Model 2 
Coefficient 
(st. err. A) 
Model 3 
Coefficient 
(st. err. A) 
Private equity investors       
intercept 2.287 *** 2.228 *** 2.156 *** 
 (0.593)  (0.595)  (0.597)  
patent stock/assets 0.060 * 0.056  0.056  
 (0.036)  (0.034)  (0.034)  
citation rate 0.173 ** 0.151 * 0.151 * 
 (0.083)  (0.093)  (0.093)  
blocking potential   0.155  0.157  
   (0.175)  (0.176)  
log(total assets) 0.202 *** 0.200 *** 0.200 *** 
 (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.028)  
return on assets 0.003  0.003  0.003  
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  
leverage 0.214  0.218  0.217  
 (0.144)  (0.144)  (0.144)  
log(age) 0.192 *** 0.193 *** 0.192 *** 
 (0.062)  (0.062)  (0.062)  
acquisition experience -0.103  -0.104  -0.103  
 (0.131)  (0.131)  (0.131)  
                                                 
6 T-tests show that the difference in the valuation of the target firm’s total assets is significant at a 1% level of 
statistical significance. 
7 The difference in return on assets is, however, statistically significantly different from zero at a 5% level of 





(st. err. A) 
Model 2 
Coefficient 
(st. err. A) 
Model 3 
Coefficient 
(st. err. A) 
acquisition experience (≥ 5) 0.401 ** 0.396 ** 0.396 ** 
 (0.161)  (0.161)  (0.161)  
Corporate investors       
patent stock/assets 0.189 *** 0.168 ** 0.170 ** 
 (0.069)  (0.072)  (0.071)  
citation rate 0.159 *** 0.137 *** 0.142 *** 
 (0.055)  (0.049)  (0.051)  
blocking potential   0.712 ** 0.540  
   (0.389)  (0.402)  
tech. proximity  9.352 *** 8.350 *** 4.772  
 (2.971)  (2.958)  (3.459)  
tech. proximity2 -20.980 *** -18.638 *** -12.614 * 
 (6.158)  (6.162)  (6.938)  
interaction proximity/     0.608 * 
blocking patents     (0.348)  
log(total assets) 0.518 *** 0.505 *** 0.496 *** 
 (0.045)  (0.046)  (0.046)  
return on assets 0.012 *** 0.012 *** 0.012 *** 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
leverage -0.089  -0.051  -0.037  
 (0.259)  (0.259)  (0.258)  
log(age) 0.088  0.089  0.090  
 (0.075)  (0.075)  (0.075)  
acquisition experience 0.150  0.118  0.128  
 (0.188)  (0.185)  (0.186)  
constant 4.572 *** 4.658 *** 4.740 *** 
 (0.555)  (0.559)  (0.561)  
8 industry dummies LR-Chi2 =  LR-Chi2 =  LR-Chi2 =  
 17.27** 17.58** 17.60** 
6 year dummies LR-Chi2 =  LR-Chi2 =  LR-Chi2 =  
 22.96*** 23.89*** 23.86*** 
Number of observations 1,204 
F-statistic 17.64*** 16.15*** 14.74*** 
R2 0.31 0.32 0.32 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
A We use heteroscedasticity-consistent Huber/White standard errors, which are clustered to account 
for multiple acquisitions by the same acquirer.  
6 Discussion  
Our results have shown that technology matters considerably in firm acquisitions – 
but to a varying extent and depending on the acquirer’s identity. Interestingly, private 
equity acquirers generally seem to pay more for a target, when we control for the 
target’s assets and characteristics. This result can be attributed to a number of factors: 
First of all, private equity investors may be able to pay a higher price than horizontal 
acquirers as these transactions are typically structured as leveraged buyouts with a 
high share of debt, while horizontal transactions tend to be financed with equity 
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(Arundale, 2002). Debt can be raised at significantly lower costs than equity which is 
why private equity investors can afford a higher merger premium.  
Moreover, as the EVCA figures indicated, there has been an abundance of funds over 
the last years that private equity investors almost desperately need to invest into 
prospective target companies (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005). The abundance of funds 
might even crowd out corporate investors. For the venture capital market Gompers 
and Lerner (2000) have argued that increasing capital inflows lead to higher security 
prices, or put simply, “too much money chasing too few deals”. Their results show a 
strong positive correlation between the valuation of such investments and capital 
inflows. In this relationship, a doubling in public market values is associated with a 
15-35 percent increase in valuation while a doubling of capital inflows leads to an 
increase of between 7 and 21 percent. As they find inflows into leveraged buyout 
funds to be a reliable instrumental variable for inflows to venture capital funds, we 
can assume that the abundance of funds available to private equity investors positively 
affects the acquisition price of private equity deals. Together with the higher cost of 
equity this could lead to a higher merger premium of private equity acquisitions 
relative to corporate acquisitions. 
Our results indicate that patents have a high importance in M&A transactions. Patents 
indeed serve as a signal to exhibit technological capabilities which reduces 
uncertainties associated with the firm acquisition for the investors (Ndofor and 
Levitas, 2004; Levitas and McFadyen, 2006). Results of prior work on the importance 
of patents as signals in initial public offerings (IPO) can hence be transferred to the 
market for corporate control (Heeley et al., 2007). Both types of investors obviously 
succeed in identifying the technology employed by a target company. They are found 
to pay higher prices for targets with valuable technological assets. There seems to be 
no significant knowledge gap between private equity investors and corporate 
investors. Such a gap could have come about due to prior acquisition experience or 
personnel skilled in the art. In other words, both types of investors seem to have 
developed the necessary absorptive capacity for identifying valuable technologies. 
However, patents with a blocking potential only provide additional value for 
corporate investors, whereas the patent stock and patent value are important for both. 
This result becomes more pronounced when the blocking potential is interacted with 
the technology relatedness of the acquiring and target firms. Corporate investors 
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deliberately identify targets with patents that could, on the one hand, be used to 
extend their present R&D activities into areas that were previously blocked by 
competitors and, on the other hand, provide a basis to protect and secure the firm’s 
own technology domains. Patents in corporate acquisitions therefore always serve not 
only a technological but also a strategic objective in technology markets (Blind et al., 
2007). Surprisingly, private equity investors do not show an interest in patents with a 
blocking potential although these patents should serve as a basis for sustainable rent 
appropriation from innovation activities. This might hint at excessive uncertainty 
associated with such patents, resulting in a discount with respect to the desired exit 
date of the investor.  
What is more, private equity investors should not normally have to consider how the 
acquired technology fits into an existing technology portfolio. Rather, they are 
supposed to be interested in patents because they provide an indication of potential 
revenue flows and because of their expected value if sold after the acquisition. The 
technological content and the opportunity to exploit protected knowledge in 
combination with one’s own knowledge stocks are, however, of great importance for 
corporate investors. They deliberately strive to complement their own technology 
portfolio by redeploying technological resources in order to increase their own 
innovative capabilities (Cassiman et al., 2005; Hussinger, 2005; Sorescu et al., 2007). 
Corporate investors therefore attach a higher value to patents than private equity 
investors. 
In this respect, our results extend existing knowledge on the motivation for firm 
acquisitions. For the first time, the two key functions of patents – as monopoly rent 
devices and as blocking instruments – are shown to be reflected in the market for 
corporate control. Their importance, however, differs according to the type of 
acquirer. In particular, the deliberate acquisition of patents with a blocking potential 
by corporate investors has a significant impact on the allocation of technological 
assets in the market. It hints at a concentration of key technologies in technology 
markets through acquisitions. This links our results with an important implication for 
competition policy. M&A transactions, to a large extent, are carried out in the 
intention of creating barriers to entry in specific technology markets and, hence, 
decreasing competition. This tendency needs to be reflected in a firm’s M&A 
strategy. Firms need to keep a careful eye on the key technologies in their industry 
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and identify the underlying intellectual property. They need to understand that 
reorganization in the industry through M&A transactions could be directed at a 
concentration of key technologies and that, through redeployment resulting in a new 
combination with other technological assets, these technologies might serve as a basis 
to threaten the novelty requirements of future patent applications. 
This result is also of great relevance for private equity investors who apparently do 
not attach particular importance to patents with a blocking potential. The value of the 
acquired firm’s technological assets may nonetheless depreciate substantially if the 
firm is blocked in its subsequent R&D activities by other firms’ patents. Given the 
rather short investment horizon of private equity investors, there is a clear need to 
make sure that the technological assets are not threatened by other patents. As this 
would sharply decrease the price that a private equity investor can obtain upon its 
exit, it should be a key interest to secure those targets with the necessary stock of 
patents. 
7 Conclusion and future research 
This paper has examined a sample of European firm acquisitions in which corporate 
and private equity investors were involved and shown that technology matters in firm 
acquisitions. However the extent to which it matters and the ways it does so depend 
on the acquirer’s identity. Our results, however, provide no indication of whether 
there is an effect of acquirer identity on innovation performance following the deal. 
Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) provided evidence that private equity investor 
ownership leads to higher shareholder value. It is questionable, however, whether 
such an effect also holds in the context of technology. Previous studies have indicated 
that the interpretation of the post-merger developments in R&D is not that 
straightforward. A decrease in innovation activity after an acquisition might 
correspond to post-merger integration difficulties (such as problems in the integration 
of two firms’ R&D departments) that hinder the exploitation of the joint capacities 
(Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Grimpe, 2007). However, a post-merger decrease in 
technology outcome can also be the response to a dominant position of the merged 
entity in technology markets (market power effect), which reduces the incentives to 
innovate. In such cases that engender a decrease in innovation activities, an 
independent advancement of the technology portfolio in a firm owned by a private 
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equity investor might lead to a superior technological outcome. This perspective 
opens the door for future research that should try to generate empirical evidence on 
the longitudinal performance of firm acquisitions with respect to different acquirer 
identities. 
Moreover, it would be desirable to identify buy-and-build strategies that private 
equity investors execute to create a new and integrated company. In this case, 
motivations regarding the acquired technologies should also differ from those in other 
private equity transactions as the acquired firms are expected to fit together 
technologically. More valuable patents and those with a blocking character should 
hence also receive more importance for private equity investors. A critical 
prerequisite for that, however, would be the ability to track the post-merger 
development of the target company, whether it is subsequently integrated and – if so – 
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Table 3: Bivariate correlations 
Private equity investors 
 
Corporate investors 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 
1. Log(deal value)   0.34 *** 0.16 *** 0.01  0.17 *** 0.00  0.17 *** 0.08 **     -0.01  0.08 ** 
2. Log(total assets) 0.50 ***   0.22 *** -0.09 ** 0.23 *** -0.26 *** 0.14 *** 0.02      -0.05  -0.05  
3. Return on assets 0.07  -0.13 ***   0.07 ** 0.29 *** 0.00  0.05  -0.11 ***     -0.17 *** -0.14 *** 
4. Leverage -0.09 * -0.03  -0.16 ***   0.04  0.02  -0.01  -0.09 **     -0.10 *** -0.09 ** 
5. Log(age) 0.09 * 0.05  0.11 ** -0.07    -0.02  0.08 ** -0.05      -0.17 *** -0.24 *** 
6. Patent stock/total 
assets 0.11 ** -0.11 ** 0.10 ** -0.05  0.04    0.04  0.24 ***     0.01  0.01  
7. Citation rate 0.19 *** 0.12 *** -0.04  -0.03  0.11 ** 0.06    0.40 ***     0.01  0.02  
8. Blocking potential 0.21 *** 0.18 *** -0.08 * -0.10 ** 0.03  0.19 *** 0.24 ***       0.11 *** 0.10 ** 
9. Technological 
proximity 0.08 ** 0.08 * -0.11 ** -0.09 ** -0.01  -0.01  0.18 *** 0.11 **         
10. (Technological 
proximity) 2 0.04  0.05  -0.08 * -0.08  -0.01  -0.01  0.16 *** 0.06  0.92 ***       
11. Acquisition 
experience 0.01  0.01  -0.12 *** 0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.04  0.09 ** 0.05  0.07    0.58 *** 
12. Acquisition 
experience >5                         
**, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level; n = 1,204 
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Table 4: Frequency distribution of the number of acquisitions over the past three 
years by type of acquiring firm 
Number of acquisitions Corporate investor Private equity investor Total
0 352 263 615 
1 56 84 140 
2 51 70 121 
3 19 48 67 
4 1 31 32 
5 0 32 32 
6 0 13 13 
7 0 21 21 
8 0 8 8 
10 0 31 31 
11 0 12 12 
13 0 13 13 
19 0 13 13 
93 0 86 86 
Total number of acquisitions 479 725 1,204
 
 
